THE BROADCAST LICENSEE AS FIDUCIARY:
TOWARD THE ENFORCEMENT OF DISCRETION
JONATHAN MALLAMUD *

Under the traditional view of the first amendment to the United

States Constitution, the protection of freedom of speech requires
that the government abstain from engaging in any activity affecting

speech unless that activity is essential to the protection of some
other vital governmental interest.1 But recent arguments for a right
of access to the broadcast media proceed upon the basis that this

traditional theory of the first amendment is inadequate because it
fails to ensure a sufficiently vital marketplace for the full expression

of ideas that is necessary in our democratic state.2 At the same time,
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1. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37
Gno. WAsH. L. Rnv. 487 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right];
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron, Access to the Press];
Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CiN. L. Ray. 447 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Barrow];
Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
and Access, 85 HiAv. L. REv. 768 (1972) [hereinafter cited.as Jaffe];
Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase
Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. Ray. 574 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Johnson
& Westen];
Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW &
EcoN. 15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kalven];
Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, 34
LAW & CoNTEMp. PROB. 278 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Loevinger];
Malone, Broadcasting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right
of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 J. OF LAw RasFo.m 194
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Malone];
Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red
Lion, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 974 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Marks].
2. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right 499-509; Johnson &
Westen 603-04; cf. Barron, Access to the Press 1642-43. See also Homing, The
First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE L.J 931, 954; Mayo, The
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the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine,8
Free Forum: Development of a Democratic Forum in the Limited Media of Mass
Communication, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (1954). For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the right of access, see Malone.
3. The FCC's fairness doctrine requires that broadcast licensees give fair
coverage to each side of public issues. The doctrine was first set out in detail in
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); however, the FCC
had mentioned the concept of fairness earlier. See United Broadcasting Co., 10
F.C.C. 515, 517 (1945). The FCC further explained the doctrine in Applicability
of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964), and the Supreme Court has summarized it concisely (including the personal attack rules) in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 369-70, 373-79 (1969). The doctrine was given congressional recognition when section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1970), was amended in 1959. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Public Law 86-274, 73 Stat.
557. Following the Supreme Court decision in Red Lion, the FCC issued a Notice of
Inquiry and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to reconsider the fairness doctrine
and possibly to clarify it. Obligations of Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness
Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27 (1970). Even before Red Lion, the fairness doctrine
had been extended to cigarette advertising. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Thereafter, it became apparent that the fairness doctrine could be extended to other kinds of advertising.
See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see
Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Neckritz v. FCC, 446 F.2d 501
(9th Cir. 1971). After the Friends of the Earth decision, Neckritz was remanded
to the FCC, which affirmed its original decision denying the claim that was based
on the fairness doctrine. Alan F. Neckritz, 25 P & F RADIO R(u. 2D 631 (1972).
Furthermore, the right of access also received judicial recognition. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 405 U.S. 953 (1972) (argued on October 16, 1972, see 41 U.S.L.W. 3224
(1972) ); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). In order to reconsider the fairness doctrine, the right of access, and
the application of the fairness doctrine to political broadcasting, the FCC instituted,
by Notice of Inquiry, a proceeding entitled The Handling of Public Issues Under
the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications
Act. See 30 FC.C.2d 26 (1971). Following the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, the FCC
indicated that a final decision by the FCC on the right of access would have to
await the Supreme Court's decision in that case. See Order and Further Notice of
Inquiry, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, P & F RADIo Rc. (1972 Current
Service) 53:463. In June 1972, the FCC issued its first report, Handling of Political
Broadcasts. See 24 P & F RADro
G. 2D 1917 (1972). Thus, at this time both
the FCC's fairness doctrine and the right of access must be considered in a somewhat less than stable state. The complexity and sensitivity of the problems presented are illustrated by the disputes that arise under the fairness doctrine by
each of the two major political parties seeking reply time to political broadcasts,
see, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1972), and the subject of counteradvertising.
See Note, Television Counteradvertising: "And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor.
.,"

3 RuTGERs CAmDiEN L.J. 516 (1972).
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which purports to assure balanced coverage of controversial issues
on radio and television, received its constitutional support from the
first amendment's purpose "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail."4
As early as 1947 Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote:
The mere absence of governmental restrictions will not make
newspapers and other instrumentalities of communication play their
proper part in the kind of society we desire. In addition, affirmative action must be taken either by the government or by other persons with power to influence methods and content. 5
As the justification for the fairness doctrine, the FCC pointed out
that mass communications should serve to further the "development
of an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of
The main difference between the fairness doctrine and the right of access is
that under the fairness doctrine a party challenging a station's presentation on the
grounds of fairness need not be given a right to reply, but the fairness obligation is
met by the licensee complying with the fair coverage requirement in a manner decided by the licensee. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 902-03
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Access requires that a person be given the opportunity to present
views directly over the facilities of a licensee. See note 11 infra and accompanying
text. See also Johnson & Westen 579, 606. Cf. Barron, Access to the Press 1667.
Under the fairness doctrine the only requirements that specific people be given a
right to reply deal with cases of personal attacks or editorials taking sides among
competing candidates. See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 28
(1971); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1972) (all identical).
A great deal has been written about the right of access and the fairness doctrine, and, consequently, there is no need to discuss the history or details of those
doctrines here. For the history and details of the right of access and the fairness
doctrine, see, e.g., Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale
for Broadcasting'sFairness Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. Rtv. 31 (1964); Barron, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
1 (1961); Barrow; Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the
Emperor's New Clothes, 23 FEn. CoM. B.J. 75 (1969); Houser, The Fairness Doctrine-An HistoricalPerspective, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 550 (1972); Johnson &
Westen; Loevinger; Malone; Marks; Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MiNN.
L. REV. 67, 127-51 (1967); Sullivan, Editorialsand Controversy: The Broadcaster's
Dilemma, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 719 (1964); Note, A Fair Break for Controversial
Speakers: Limitations of the FairnessDoctrine and the Need for Individual Access,
39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 532 (1971); Note, From the F.C.C.'s FairnessDoctrine to
Red Lion's Fiduciary Principle, 5 HARv. Crv. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. Rnv. 89 (1970);
Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1222 (1970).
4. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
5. 2 Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 471 (1947).
See also 1 id. at 28; Mayo, supranote 2, at 391, 391 n.8.
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news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the day." But
for the fairness doctrine to succeed, the FCC, a government agency,
must involve itself to some extent in the evaluation of the content of
broadcast programming." Thus, on the one hand, to the extent that
control of the mass communications media is in private hands, the
general public's right to free speech is severely limited.8 On the other
hand, any attempt to promote free speech by regulation of content
by the FCC raises the issue of government infringement upon free
speech.9
To some extent, the problems of government involvement in
fairness might be avoided if those who disagreed with the programming presented by a licensee had a right to reply over the facilities
of the licensee, or at least had the right to purchase time from the
licensee to state views on controversial subjects of public importance. 10 The developing concept of a right of access would, if it
6. Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), where the
Supreme Court stated, "[it is the right of the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial
here."
7. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine,
supra note 3, at 24; Marks 1004; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 748, 768. As Professor
Harry Kalven wrote,
[tlo a considerable extent the Commission's concern with fairness and with
program balance rests on the nonrepresentative nature of broadcasting today. And since these concerns run against the economic self-interest of
the broadcaster they are doomed to futility unless the FCC is forced to
play a role of so directly controlling programming as to conflict flagrantly with the First Amendment. Kalven 32.
A footnote to the title of Kalven's article reads as follows:
This essay is largely based on a memorandum written a year ago for the
Columbia Broadcasting System, a circumstance which accounts for certain
emphases of style and content. I am most grateful to CBS for their
generous support of my study of the broadcasting-free speech problem
and for their courtesy in permitting me to borrow so heavily from the
memorandum here. Id. at 1 n.1.
See also Blake, supra note 3, at
Malone 253.
Cronkite, Introduction to
Part I11 Points of Conflict-Legal Issues Confronting Media Today, 60 Gao. L.J.
1001, 1002 (1972); Ervin, Introduction to Part I. FoundationMedia-Evolution of
Printed Communication, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society,
GEo. L.J 871, 872 (1972).
See Barron, Access to the Press 1649. The Supreme Court has stated that
"the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of
the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 163.
10. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 238 (1970) (dissenting opin-
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matured into an enforceable right, permit advocates of positions on
public issues to have direct access to a licensee's facilities either to

respond to positions taken on those facilities or to discuss issues
which they select. 1

Because the licensee would not have editorial

control over the content of the controversial material presented, it
might appear at first blush that the licensee would not be limiting
the free speech of those who might want access. But upon closer

analysis, it becomes clear that the licensee would have to decide
who will receive access, and that will involve a judgment as to particular issues. Furthermore, the licensee will have to decide how
much time will be allocated for each issue and when the material
will be presented. Presumably, the granting of access time will not
relieve the licensee of obligations under the fairness doctrine. For
these reasons, those dealing with the right of access in broadcasting
recognize that the FCC would have to regulate the enforcement of
the right. 12 The problems involved in applying this right of access
ion, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson), rev'd sub nom., Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405
U.S. 953 (1972) (argued on October 16, 1972, see 41 U.S.L.W. 3224 (1972)).
11. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642,
656 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Malone 254; Note, A Fair Break for ControversialSpeakers:
Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 532, 557-58 (1971). In Business Executives' the court of appeals
held that a broadcast licensee could not maintain a flat ban on editorial advertising.
450 F.2d at 646, 665. Complainants, charging that a licensee has presented one
side of a controversial issue, sometimes request free time to reply to material presented on the licensee's facilities. See, e.g., Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 325
(D.C. Cir. 1971). In this context access may be viewed as complementary to the
fairness doctrine, although to the extent that it restricts a licensee's discretion it
can be argued that access conflicts with the fairness doctrine. See Oral Argument
Before the Supreme Court, Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,
41 U.S.L.W. 3217-18 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1972). See also Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
25 F.C.C.2d 216, 223-26 (1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The right
of access was placed on first amendment grounds in Business Executives. Id. at 646.
Because the right of access also can be considered in terms of the public interest,
it might even be placed on statutory grounds. Cf. Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right 498-500. There is also the right of access to the press which is
said should follow from the commands of the first amendment. See id. at 488-94;
Barron, Access to the Press 1647-56, 1666. At least at first, it appears that such a
right would be judicially enforced. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment
Right 495.
12. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642,
664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Johnson & Westen 613; Malone 254, 258-61. See
also Houser, supra note 3, at 551. Cf. Mayo, The Limited Forum: An Analysis
of Restrictions on the Discussion of Public Issues in the Channels of Mass Communication, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 261, 297 (1954).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:89

can be formidable. After a detailed analysis of one aspect of the
right of access problem-access to rebut remarks of the Presidentone writer concludes that it would be better to leave the decisions

as to "spokesmen, format, timing and electronic environment" used
to answer the President to the "discretion" of broadcast journalists,
subject to "the broad standards of 'fairness' and 'reasonableness.' ",13

Another problem is that even with a working system of access
there can be no assurance that those who seek and obtain access will

necessarily represent the full spectrum of views necessary to the fair
coverage of the issues.

And even if they did represent a sufficient

cross-section, they may not present their case as effectively as the
professional journalist. 4 The first amendment right that belongs
to the people and not the broadcasters 6 consists of a right to be informed, not simply a right to speak. 10 Therefore, the right of access should not be considered as a substitute for the general obliga-

tion of the broadcast licensee to give fair treatment to important,
controversial issues.

What is required is the development and enforcement of a doctrine that would give a broadcast licensee wide discretion concerning
the means and details of the presentation of controversial issues of

public importance, but, at the same time, prevent a licensee from
using that discretion to neglect the coverage of such issues. Although
the fairness doctrine sounds as if it would accomplish this, its main
13. Cohn, Access to Television to Rebut the President of the United States:
An Analysis and Proposal,45 TEMP. L.Q. 141, 208 (1972). Cf. Putz, Fairnessand
Commercial Advertising: A Review and A Proposal, 6 U. SAN FRA.clsco L. Ray.
215, 248 (1972). In advocating that a licensee be deemed to have complied with
the fairness doctrine insofar as it applies to commercials if he has set aside free
reply time, Professor C. Delos Putz, Jr. suggests that although the licensee's discretion should not be reviewed on a case by case basis, the FCC should review it in
conjunction with license renewals every three years. Id.
14. See Malone 267. Although Professor Malone recognizes that reliance on the
fairness doctrine is one solution to the problem, he also proposes that licensees
should give professional assistance to those seeking access. Id.
15. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
16. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 255. See also Note, FCC License Renewal Policy and the Right to Broadcast,
52 BosToN U.L. REv. 94, 134 (1972).
Cf. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY oF

E FrsT AMENDMENT 10-11 (1966).

The FCC has stated that
the needs and interests of the general public with respect to programs devoted to new [sic] commentary and opinion can only be satisfied by making
available to them for their consideration and acceptance or rejection, of
varying and conflicting views held by responsible elements of the community. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247
(1949).
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fault appears to be the failure to force licensees to give adequate
coverage to controversial issues. 17 Nevertheless, the thesis presented
in this article is that, building on the fairness doctrine, a doctrine
can be developed that would enable the FCC to enforce a positive
duty of the licensee to use good faith efforts to present controversial

issues of public importance. By good faith efforts is meant a standard
that would require coverage of such issues,' s and that would prevent
licensees from evading their obligation with the claim that the decision on what to present on their station must be left to their discre-

tion. Discretion can be, and really must be, interpreted to mean discretion as to how to do something, and not discretion to avoid doing
it. This point inevitably leads to the~question of whether such a doctrine can be enforced so as to insure that the result is not government
censorship or government infringement on the full and fair use of the

broadcast media. 19 Professor Thomas I. Emerson recognized the
need for some government control of the content of radio and tele-

vision programming and suggested that it is necessary "to formulate
reasonably concrete standards, based upon the underlying principle
of public service and diversity" and "to develop the institutions and

techniques" to apply those standards.2" Professor Glen 0. Robinson
said that "[tihere is no tradition of establishing, for example, stand-

ards of 'fairness,' 'diversity,' or 'balance.' "21

Former FCC Com-

17. See, e.g., Malone 214-15; Marks 976.
18. It must be recognized that in talking about fair coverage of issues of public
importance a great deal more is involved than just news and discussion programs.
Issues relevant to the kind of speech protected by the first amendment may be
dealt with in a wide range of radio and television programming including what is
usually called entertainment programming. See Malone 204-05; Pierson, The Need
for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. CoM. B.J. 15, 22 (1963); Note, From the
F.C.C.'s Fairness Doctrine, supra note 3. Cf. Meiklejohn, supra note 16, at
256-57, 262.
19. Cf. Kalven 37.
20. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 112.
21. Robinson, supra note 3, at 161. Professor Robinson's comment really
indicates that we have been deficient in developing first amendment doctrine. The
paragraph from which the quote in the text is taken reads as follows:
Neither society as a whole, Congress, nor the FCC has ever formulated
any principles which satisfactorily guide judgment on such matters consistent with the aims of an open society. There have developed, in a long
Anglo-American tradition of legal and social thinking, various controls on
the abuse of free speech, but nowhere in this tradition has there been any
developed thinking going beyond sporadic and occasional restraints, such
as prohibition of defamatory speech, obscenity, fraud, and otherwise patently harmful or socially disrupting speech. There is no tradition of
establishing, for example, standards of "fairness," "diversity," or "balance." These are judgments which, for better or for worse, have been left
to the admittedly sometimes quixotic judgment of the public, unguided
by their "enlightened" cultural, social, or political leaders. Id.
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missioner Lee Loevinger, on the other hand, found in the fiduciary
22
duty of the licensee, upheld in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,
the beginnings of a doctrine that would permit the FCC to promote
the full coverage of views on radio and television without abridging
the free speech guaranteed by the first amendment. 23 Although he
admits that the concept of the fiduciary duty might not necessarily
"insure a free marketplace of ideas, prevent government censorship,
and help maintain a democratic social and economic order, '24 he
does not lack some hope for the idea. He concludes:
It never was certain that the principles of the first amendment would
be successful. The ideal remains the same. The challenge now is
to say what the ideal of free speech means and how it may be
achieved in the confused, groping society of today's turbulent technological world9 5
The present author contends that it is possible to develop the
concept of the fiduciary duty of the licensee into a doctrine that
will permit the FCC to help establish a marketplace of ideas in broadcasting without permitting the government to inhibit free expression
on radio and television. In this article, the author proposes to examine the constitutional context inwhich regulation of broadcasting
takes place and to develop from the concept of the fiduciary duty of
the broadcast licensee a doctrine that would permit positive FCC enforcement of a duty to cover controversial public issues. In addition,
the problems surrounding the present state of the fairness doctrine
and the FCC's enforcement of it will be considered, and some recommendations concerning the enforcement of the expanded concept
developed here will be made.
PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL CENSORSHIP

Because of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the FCC may
enforce the fairness doctrine to insure that the airwaves remain open
for the expression of the views of those who would not get access
to the broadcast media without governmental assistance. 20 Although the amount of time that a broadcast station licensee must devote to public issues lies within his discretion, 27 the fairness doctrine
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
Loevinger 290-98. See also Marks 999-1001.
Loevinger 298.
Id.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949).

Fol-
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"requires the broadcast licensee to afford reasonable opportunity for

the discussion of conflicting viewpoints on controversial issues of
public importance. ' '2 8 Without some requirement that broadcasters devote time to the coverage of public issues, the requirement of
a fair and balanced presentation might result in an overall contraction of free speech because broadcasters would simply refuse to deal

with controversial issues.2 9

Nevertheless, some controversy does

seem to exist with regard to the obligation to broadcast controversial
issues.30 The Supreme Court, in the Red Lion case, recognized the
difficulty and suggested that it could reconsider the problem if ex-

perience indicated that the fairness obligation had "the net effect of
reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of cover"31 At the same time, the Court pointed out that "if
age . .
present licensees should suddenly prove timorous, the Commission
is not powerless to insist that they give adequate and fair attention
lowing the proceeding in which the FCC decided to give preferred renewal status to
licensees judged to have rendered "substantial service" to the public, Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22
F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), set aside, Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the FCC undertook to define "substantial service" as including specified minimum percentages of
time for local programming, news, and public affairs. See Formulation of Policies
Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative
Hearing Process, P & F RADIO REG. (1972 Current Service) 53:429, 431 (the FCC
officially adopted this statement on Feb. 17, 1971). Had the "substantial service"
policy been allowed to be followed by the FCC, it might have resulted in closer FCC
control of the amount of time devoted to public affairs programming.
28. Obligations of Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.
2d 27 (1970). See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249,
1251 (1949). The obligation to cover public issues has been called the "absolute
component" of the fairness obligation, as opposed to the "relative component" that
requires a fair and balanced presentation of an issue that is covered. Malone 215.
The Supreme Court apparently recognized the twofold aspect of the fairness doctrine when it spoke of "the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair
coverage." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (emphasis added).
29. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392-93 (1969).
See Marks 990. The validity of the fear that broadcasters might refrain from covering controversial issues rather than subject themselves to obligations under the
fairness doctrine is illustrated by the recent refusal of the television networks to
accept the Allstate Insurance Company's advertisements for automobile airbags.
See Harike Gets Same Answer as Allstate, BRoADcAsTING, August 28, 1972, at 18.
But some individual stations did carry the advertisement. See Hard Way, BRoADCASATNG, October 16, 1972, at 5.

30. Compare Blake, supra note 3, at 78 with Malone 215 n.111.
31. 395 U.S. at 393.
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to public issues."32
Before the Red Lion case, Professor Harry Kalven criticized
the fairness doctrine because it "invites the widest informal surveillance by the Commission. ' 33 It is certainly true that the doctrine is
administered in the context of a system of licensing which gives the

FCC wide powers over broadcast licensees. 34 But to stop there,
with the prevailing image being one of government control of an
enterprise engaged in the exercise of first amendment rights, is unduly simplistic. In the first place, the FCC is subject to control by

the judiciary. 5 Of far more importance, however, is the fact that
the "government versus private citizen" image assumes a far simpler
society than actually exists.

As the Supreme Court put it, "[tihere

is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all. ' ' as
To a large extent the controversy surrounding the permissible

extent of FCC regulation of program content focuses on villains.
Most people traditionally tend to view the government as the main

enemy of free speech, and thus it is easy to criticize FCC regulation. 37 But the situation in our present society is far more complex

than a simple confrontation between the government and private
citizens who are exercising their right to free speech. In order to
get a proper view, one must understand the nature of the broadcast

licensee who is supposed to be in control of the program content that
is broadcast over the assigned station. Various writers have pointed
out that the licensees find themselves subject to non-governmental
pressures that inhibit them from providing free and full coverage of
32. Id.
33. Kalven 47.
34. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-19 (1970). But see id. § 326 (forbidding censorship
by the FCC).
35. Id. § 402.
36. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969). The remark was made in the context of upholding the personal attack rules. At the same
time, the sentence immediately preceding the one quoted in the text reads as follows: "Otherwise, station owners and a few networks would have unfettered
power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their
own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only
those with whom they agreed." Id. Since this latter sentence seems to apply
broadly to all issues, not just personal attacks, it would appear that the sentence
quoted in the text may turn out to apply in a context somewhat broader than
merely the personal attack situation.
37. See, e.g., Kalven 46-47; Pierson, supra note 18, at 17-18. See also Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 768.
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public issues.38 As Professor Donald M. Malone has suggested, the
broadcasters' primary interest is "earning money from deliberately
non-controversial programming designed to appeal to large, profitable audiences. '3 9 At the same time there is nothing in the fairness
doctrine that prevents a licensee from expressing opinions on the
air.40 Thus, the problem cannot really be dealt with in terms of
government censorship of a private entity. Furthermore, one must
keep returning to the central point, which, as the Supreme Court
indicated, "is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which

is crucial here."41 In the context of the public's right to receive
information, limitations on content by the licensee become just as
38. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right 500-02; Barrow, The
Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REv. 633, 63436, 639-41 (1966); Crandall, The Economic Effect of Television-Network Program
"Ownership," 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 385, 393 (1971); Johnson, Freedom to Create:
The Implications of Antitrust Policy for Television Programming Context, 8 OsGOODE, HALL L.J. 10, 15 n.3; Johnson & Westen 627; Note, A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 532, 559 (1971); Comment, We Pick 'Em,
You Watch 'Em: First Amendment Rights of Television Viewers, 43 S. CAL. L. REv.
826, 827, 831-34 (1970).
39. Malone 249 (citation omitted). See also Jaffe 780, where Professor Jaffe
suggests that the reason broadcasters fear a requirement that they sell time for the
advertising of views on controversial issues is that they would lose large parts of
their audience as well as money because of the possibility of having to give free
reply time.
In a recent editorial suggesting that stations affiliated with networks establish
a mechanism for consultation on a professional level, Broadcasting magazine said:
"Whatever the affiliates may have to say about the control or clearance of network
news programs is traditionally said between station management and the stationrelations departments of the networks. Communication on that level is certain to
be affected more by business considerations than by journalistic standards or aspirations. . . ." Editorial, Professional to Professional,BROADCASTING, Feb. 5, 1973,
at 74. The thrust of this comment indicates that editorial considerations may be
subordinated to business considerations. It must be recognized that a suggestion
that licensees should look to non-business considerations in making editorial decsions is very different from saying that profits inhibit broadcast journalism. Indeed, it may well be that the existence of profits facilitates the broadcasting of
controversial issues. See Profit Motivates Television News, Professor Finds, BRoADcAsTiNG, Jan. 22, 1973, at 32. At the same time it is not necessarily inconsistent to
say that high profits permit a station to broadcast controversial programming while
also saying that the quest for high profits may inhibit the broadcast of controversial
programming. For the purposes of the present article, the important point is the
suggestion that commercial considerations interfere with the licensee's exercise of
judgment in the public interest.
40. See Malone 249.
41. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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important as restrictions on the licensee by the government. Consequently, both the government and the licensee must be considered
potential villains.
At any rate, Professor Kalven's rather simple analogy of the
FCC as a chairman of a town meeting with the obligation to let all
people speak with a minimum of content regulation 42 is inapt and
misleading. It is more accurate to suggest that the broadcast licensee
is the chairman because it is the licensee who has the power to decide
who will speak on his station at any given time. The FCC is in the
position of the one who decides who may be a chairman and who
sets the standards, in the public interest, to be followed by a chairman.
The notion of a private entity performing a public function
subject to government regulation is not at all a strange one to American government. In the area of broadcasting the interest in preserving first amendment rights makes the task sensitive and of extreme importance. But that only intensifies the problem, it does not
yield the solution. To over-simplify the model, and then point to the
danger of government censorship, only serves to encourage neglect
of the problem; it does not solve it. A licensee is not only a private
entity exercising free speech; it is also an economic entity engaged
in a profit-making enterprise, and allowed to do so because it is
probably better for the preservation of free speech that the direct
editorial function of communications not be in the hands of the government.
Over twenty years ago Professor A. A. Berle, Jr., wrote:
The emerging principle appears to be that the corporation, itself a
creation of the state, is as subject to constitutional limitations which
limit action as is the state itself. If this doctrine, now coming into
view, is carried to full effect, a corporation having economic and supposedly juridical power to take property, to refuse to give equal service, to discriminate between man and man, group and group, race
and race, to an extent denying "the equal protection of the laws," or
violate constitutional limitations, is subject to direct leotherwise to
gal action. 48
42. Kalven 47-48. Professor Kalven writes of the "speakers" who are "licensed"
by the "chairman" under an implicit standard limiting the chairman to "noncontent
regulation." Id. at 48. In the first place, few people would probably say that a
chairman of a meeting does not regulate content. But he does suggest that the
FCC could go "farther," id., and so I have used the phrase "minimum content
regulation" in the text to describe his analogy.
43. Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Per-
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Of course, Professor Berle was not focusing on the problem of communications, and he did not suggest that the
"emerging principle"

had yet become the law."

But his ideas illustrate that our society

is too complex to be considered solely in terms of the distinction be-

tween private entities and the government. Rather, the focus should

be on the rights and needs of the people; and the institutions and
doctrines created to protect those rights and satisfy those needs should
be judged in terms of their contribution to these goals. In the present
context what must be promoted and protected is the public's right to

receive all types of ideas. The fairness doctrine, and its attendant content control, should be evaluated in terms of whether it serves this

function.
Another point that must be made is that the FCC is not government-it is simply a part of government operating as an independent regulatory commission. In that respect it does not seem warranted to assume that the FCC will abuse fundamental rights just
because it appears that the government will do so.41 It does not
seem particularly new or unique to suggest, at this late date, that it

sonal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933,
942 (1952) (citation omitted).
44. See id. at 954-55.
45. Cf. Kalven 48-49; Jaffe 786. CBS News Correspondent Walter Cronkite
sharply criticized the notion of review of broadcast journalism by any government
panel. He said: "To place licensed broadcast medium under threat of such investigation is to place it permanently under fear of accountability to unfriendly antagonists wielding the power of legal restraint." Cronkite, supra note 7, at 1002.
His criticism was based upon a view of government reflected in his statement of
the issue as
whether those who are elected to public office on partisan platforms,
who represent, properly, the special interests of their region, who by
their political nature properly hold strong views on the issues of the day,
should be vested with the right to say whether broadcast journalism is
performing in the people's interests. Id.
His view is somewhat simplistic. FCC members are appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970). Federal
judges, including Justices of the Supreme Court, are appointed in the same manner.
Perhaps too much in the way of partisan considerations enters into the appointment
process, but the issue is the creation of institutions that will protect free speech, and
rather than deciding that no institution of government can do the job, one might
focus on developing better institutions or at least on improving the appointment
process. See notes 136-44 infra and accompanying text. At any rate, I doubt
that everyone would agree with Mr. Cronkite when he says, without any supporting
references: "It is not as if there were no monitor on our performance in broadcast
journalism. The newspapers have served this function well. They have proved to
be, and will continue to be, severe critics of the broadcast medium. .. ." Cronkite,
supra note 7, at 1002. See also Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free
Society, 60 Gno. LJ. 867, 944 (1972).
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may be necessary in our complex society to utilize governmental

agencies to promote and protect individual rights and liberties, even
from infringement by other parts of the government.

At the same time, one must not lose sight of the fact that
many aspects of government do present a danger to free speech.
When the television broadcasters, through the networks, attempted to
give fair coverage to a Presidential speech on the war in Indochina
by presenting commentary following it, the Vice President of the
United States criticized the networks severely.46 Although the Vice

President said, "I am not asking for government censorship or any
other kind of censorship,"4 7 it may well be said that such criticism

by a Vice President "may frighten those already unduly timid. 48 To
understand the significance of the Vice President's remarks, one
must note that he spoke at a time when broadcasters perceived a
threat from the government resulting from a new approach to license
49
renewals, enunciated by the FCC in the WHDH case.
46. Address by Vice President Spiro Agnew, Midwest Regional Republican
Meeting, November 13, 1969, printed in 115 CoNG. REc. 34043-44 (1969). He
was particularly critical of one network, which he said "trotted out Averell Harriman for the occasion." Id. at 34043. To this author, at least, the networks exercised commendable discretion in giving a balanced presentation of a news event, the
President's speech, and it seemed particularly appropriate to present Mr. Harriman,
who, the Vice President admitted, was "[flor ten months . .. America's chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks. . . ." Id.
47. Id. at 34044.
48. Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 Tnx. L. Rnv. 766,
772 (1970).
49. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The case is summarized in Note, FCC License
Renewal Policy and the Right to Broadcast, 52 BOSTON U.L. REv. 94, 95 (1972).
The President of the Federal Communications Bar Association stated the problem:
Regardless of the final outcome of WHDH or however the case may now
be categorized by the Commission or its staff, the procedural result is that
every broadcaster suddenly and unexpectedly finds himself in a situation in
which his license may be "up for grabs" every 3 years. Hearings on S.
2004 Before the Communications Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-18, pt. 1, at 32-33 (1969) (statement of Morton H. Wilner).
At the time, the broadcasters felt that they needed legislation in order to obtain the
protection they wanted. See generally id. passim. The bill, S. 2004, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969), was deferred in favor of a compromise, Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d
424 (1970), set aside Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See 447 F.2d at
1210. Given the influence of the Presidency on the Congress, and the relationship
of the Vice President to the Presidency, his remarks carried a considerably greater
potential impact than the text might indicate. Cf. Hearings on S. 2004, supra, at
415 (Statement of Lee Loevinger) (Loevinger was the former FCC commissioner
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A similar instance of subtle pressure on the networks took place
recently when the President of the United States took a position apparently in favor of limiting the number of reruns permitted on network prime time entertainment shows. 50 Although to the public this
position may seem reasonable, it is the kind of issue that seriously affects the financial interests of the broadcasters; and in evaluating
what might have chilling effects on free speech, it is the potential

speaker's perception that counts. 51
Last December, the pressure on the networks became more open.
The Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) in
the Executive Office of the President, Clay T. Whitehead, gave a
speech in which he announced that his office had submitted a license
renewal bill to the Executive Branch for eventual introduction in the

Congress. 52 It was not so much the changes that the bill would make
in the license renewal process53 that caused concern among the broadand was representing newspaper publishers who were licensees of broadcasting stations, id. at 414.).
50. See The President Takes Sides Against Network Reruns, BROADCASTING,
Sept. 18, 1972, at 12-14. In addition to his own public statements, the President spoke through Clay T. Whitehead, the director of the White House Office of
Telecommunications Policy. An examination of the relation of that Office, and implicitly the Presidency, to the FCC and Congress, is beyond the scope of this article.
Such an examination would be a useful study at this time, and may cast some
light on the degree of control a President can exercise over an independent regulatory commission.
The President's position statement took the form of an endorsement of the
Screen Actors Guild's campaign to limit network reruns in order to preserve work
for its members. See id.
51. One magazine described the President's action as follows:
Aside from obvious political motivations (California, with 45 votes,
has largest single block in Electoral College), action is seen as switch in
tactics in keeping networks on their toes, substituting rerun issue for broadsides against purported slanting of news by featured network journalists.
Closed Circuit: Party Favor, BROADCASTING, Sept. 18, 1972, at 5.
52. Address by Clay T. Whitehead, Indianapolis Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi
Luncheon, Indianapolis, Indiana, Dec. 18, 1972, at 7. The text of the proposed
bill was published in BROADCASTING,

Jan. 1, 1973,

at 20; TFLEviSiON DiGEST,

Dec. 25, 1972, at 4-5.
53. In a subsequent speech delivered to the National Academy of Television
Arts and Sciences in New York, Mr. Whitehead stated that the bill would accomplish the following:
It improves the license renewal process by making four changes in the
present practices: (1) it extends the term of broadcast licenses from
three to five years; (2) it eliminates the requirement for a comparative
hearing whenever a competing application is filed for the same broadcast
service; (3) it prohibits any restructuring of the broadcast industry
through the license renewal process; and (4) it prohibits the FCC from
considering its own predetermined program criteria in applying the ascertainment and fairness standards of the bill. Address by Clay T. White-
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casters; indeed, the provisions would give the broadcasters much of
what they had been seeking for a long time with regard to license renewals. 4 The problem was that in his speech Mr. Whitehead suggested that the local stations should exercise control over what he
alleged was biased news programming carried by the networks.55
Specifically, Mr. Whitehead said:
Station managers and network officials who fail to act to correct
imbalance or consistent bias from the networks--or who acquiese
by silence-can only be considered willing participants, to be held
fully accountable by the broadcaster's community at license renewal
56

time.

Thus, the speech seems to have been an effort to put more pressure
on the networks through station licensees by offering support for much
of what the broadcasters want in the area of license renewal in return
for their keeping a close watch on the networks.5 7
Unfortunately, it is easy to find other examples illustrating the
danger that government poses to free speech. A congressional comhead, National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, New York
City, New York, Jan. 11, 1973, at 3.
The bill would make license renewal dependent on the licensee's responsiveness to
the needs and interests of those in the station's local service area and on whether
the licensee "afforded reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views
on issues of public importance." BROADCASTmo, Jan. 1, 1973, at 20; TELnvlSION
DiEST, Dec. 25, 1972, at 4.
54. See Zeidenberg, The Push has Come to Shove in Broadcast Journalism,
BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1973, at 35. Accord, FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson,
Remarks Preparedfor Delivery to the Rhode Island School of Design Conference
on Television Communications and Community, Providence, Rhode Island, on
Jan. 22, 1973, at 8. Furthermore, the fairness obligations contained in the bill
were not new and the FCC presently has the power to enforce them. See Whitehead, Speech of Jan. 11, 1973, supra note 53, at 3; notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
55. Whitehead, Speech of Dec. 18, 1972, supra note 52, at 9-12. He used the
term "ideological plugola" to describe allegedly biased actions of television journalists.
Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 11.
57. See Commissioner Johnson, Speech of Jan. 22, 1973, supra note 54, at 8-13.
Accord, Zeidenberg, supra note 54, at 35. BROADCASTING magazine even came
out in support of the bill with the exception of the provisions relating to the
enactment of the fairness doctrine, Editorial, Better the Bill than the Blather, BROADcAsTiNG, Jan. 1, 1973, at 82, but distinguished sharply between the speech and the
bill. Id. Of the speech the magazine said: "The Whitehead jawboning on network
bias may be taken for what it is-another outburst of Nixon-administration outrage
against that familiar ogre, the Eastern liberal establishment. This time, of course,
it was articulated in context with talk about affiliate responsibilities and license
renewal. That put a hot new lead on Spiro Agnew's old scripts" Id.
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mittee conducted a vigorous investigation into a Columbia Broadcasting System program entitled "The Selling of the Pentagon" and
attempted to have the House of Representatives cite the President of
CBS for contempt when he refused to furnish the subcommittee with
material other than that actually presented on the air.5" The efforts
of the government to prevent the publication of the now famous
5 9 led Professor Louis L. Jaffe to say:
PentagonPapers
The proposition that the threat of government censorship is
much less than that of private censorship cannot withstand the lesson
of the government's attempt to suppress publication of the Pentagon
Papers. An argument of this sort can only be made by one who,
not having lived under a system of government censorship, appears to
have no idea what it really means. If one private person suppresses
a fact there are others who may publish. Not so if the government
forbids! 60
There is no need here to continue with more examples. 61 The
dangers of government censorship are certainly not less than those
of private censorship. But, it must be added, neither is private censorship limited to "one private person" suppressing a fact, for the
broadcast media are not just private persons. 62 The challenge is,
therefore, to create a tradition of free speech that is suited to protection of full debate and understanding of public issues. As already
stated, this author believes that it is possible to develop a doctrine that
will permit an independent regulatory agency to promote free speech
58. See HOUSE COMM. ON ]NTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE PROCEEDING
AGAINST FRANK STANTON AND

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,

H.R. REP.

No. 349, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Subpenaed Material Re Certain TV News
Documentary Programs, HearingsBefore the Special Subcomm. on Investigations othe House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16,

20-150 (1971).
59. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
60. Jaffe 786 (citation omitted).
61. One might mention, for example, growing instances of government subpoenaing newsmen to testify as to confidential sources. See Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Oelsner, Reporters Safeguard: Bridge Case Raises Doubts
About the Status of Privilege of the Press, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1972, at 49, cols.
7-8; Whalen Deplores Vulnerability of News Media, BROADCASTING, Oct. 2, 1972,

at 41-42.
62. Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 makes it clear that licen-

sees do not operate their stations as private owners of the frequencies.

47 U.S.C.

§ 301 (1970). See id. §§ 307(a), 309(a). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). These citations are certainly not a complete
response to Professor Jaffe, but they do indicate that the problem is more complex
than the quotation admits. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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on the airwaves without inhibiting it. It is against the background
of both private and government potential for censorship that the doctrine must be considered.
FIDuCIARY

DUTY OF THE BROADCAST LICENSEE

General Description
At the heart of a doctrine that would permit the FCC to promote free speech without restricting it lies the concept of the fiduciary
duty of the licensee. The Supreme Court, in Red Lion, summarized the duty as follows:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present
those views and voices which are representative of his community
and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.

63

In administering a doctrine based on the fiduciary obligation, the
FCC would not be in charge of program content. Instead, it would
evaluate the performance of the licensee to determine whether the
licensee inhibited or suppressed views on controversial subjects, on
the one hand, or conducted the broadcasting station in such a way
as to cover many sides of controversial public issues in a fair manner, on the other. A major problem, of course, is whether the distinction between promotion and suppression is sufficiently clear
to permit a licensee to understand and fulfill the duty and the FCC
to judge the licensee, without censoring him or preventing him from
presenting controversial issues as they appear to the licensee based on
professional judgment. The licensee must be free to present material
based on his own viewpoint and the viewpoints of professional newsmen in the employ of the licensee or his program sources-provided
that fair coverage is given to all points of view. The present author
finds the distinction between promotion and suppression readily intelligible, although on any one issue there may be room for disagreement. But this is true of any first amendment issue. 4
63. 395 U.S. at 389.
64. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Some other writers also find no inconsistency between FCC examination of program content and
protection of free speech. See, e.g., Jorgensen, Schwartz & Woods, Programming
Diversity in Proposals for New Broadcast Licenses, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 769,
803 (1964); Marks 1004-05. Former FCC Commissioner Lee Loevinger, who represents people "particularly interested in the protection of . . .free speech," Hear-
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In Red Lion, the Supreme Court based its decision upholding the
fairness doctrine on the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. 5 The

Court refrained from considering the argument that, regardless of
scarcity,
Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or press by legislation
directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and views presented to
the public through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other devices
which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit astride the channels of communication with the general public. 66
Nevertheless the concept exists and deserves consideration. The basis of the case aside, Loevinger found that the Supreme Court, in
Red Lion, "converted the responsibilities of broadcasting, with respect to information, into legal duties, and it has elevated these du6
ties to constitutional status." 7

The concept of the fiduciary duty of the broadcast licensee has
its origins in the language, as opposed to the actual results, of FCC

decisions. As early as 1945, the FCC spoke of
the duty of each station licensee to be sensitive to the problems of
public concern in the community and to make sufficient time availaings on S. 2004, supra note 49, at 414, described the duty as follows:
The right of free speech by broadcasting belongs to the public, not to the
licensee, and the licensee is a proxy for the public with a fiduciary duty to
insure the fair presentation of all viewpoints. It is all viewpoints that
are entitled to be heard, not all individuals or all spokesmen, except in
the cases, specified by statute or rule, involving political candidates or
personal attacks. The FCC may specify procedures and applications of
this fiduciary duty, but it may not constitutionally abridge the right of the
public to receive the full range of views and information which the licensee's initiative discovers or responsible elements of the community demand or offer.... Loevinger 297.
65. 395 U.S. at 400-01. Loevinger discussed the Court's basis for the decision
as follows:
The scarcity argument with respect to broadcasting facilities logically
militates as strongly against government suppression through the licensing
power as in favor of it. The theory and spirit of the first amendment, as
repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court, is that government action must
not be exerted to suppress any expression, no matter how hateful or noxious in the view of officials, except within certain limited and defined
categories. Where the opportunity for 'expression is unlimited, as in private speech or writing, government action to suppress some particularly
objectionable expression may have a relatively limited effect on the general discourse. But where the opportunity for expression is limited and
requires a government license, any action by government to suppress expression through the licensed facilities or to favor or disfavor particular
kinds of expression will necessarily have greater influence and impact on
all expression over similarly licensed facilities. Since the first amendment
commands government neutrality with respect to the content of all types of
expression, government action to control the content of expression on limited and licensed facilities is peculiarly inappropriate. Loevinger 283.
66. 395 U.S. at 401 n.28 (citation omitted).
67. Loevinger 297.
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ble, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for full discussion thereof, without
any type of censorship which would undertake to impose the views
of the licensee upon the material to be broadcast .... 6s
When, four years later, the FCC approved the right of licensees to
editorialize, the majority opinion stated that "the licensee is a trustee
impressed with the duty of preserving for the public generally radio
as a medium of free expression and fair presentation.""0 The FCC
also recognized that the "right of the public to be informed . . .
is the foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting."70
Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals recently echoed that statement when he found that "central
to the fairness doctrine is the promotion of informed decision-making
by the public ....,71 In order to keep the public informed, the
FCC made it clear in its opinion that the licensees "have an affirmative duty generally to encourage and implement the broadcast of all
sides of controversial public issues over their facilities. ....
In
fulfilling this affirmative duty, the FCC suggested that the licensees
must play "a conscious and positive role in bringing about balanced
presentation of the opposing viewpoints."7 3
In light of this language, the licensee occupies a very special
and important position in society. He is supposed to be a specialist
in the education of the public through the broadcasting media. Yet
when it comes to network programming at least, the licensees do not
appear to fulfill that function.7 4 But the question here is not whether
compliance with the duty is being enforced, but whether such compliance can be enforced vigorously and the duty developed through such
enforcement. It would seem that, at a minimum, the language implies that decisions on programming should be based not only on the
need to make a profit, but also on the need to inform the public on important issues. With the ability to make a profit comes the obligation to engage in an educational and informative role. A licensee
should be more than a businessman; he should be a professional who
68. United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515, 517 (1945).
69. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1258 (1949).
70. Id. at 1249.
71. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 257
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251 (1949).
73. Id. See Friends of the Earth, 23 P & F Rnio REa. 2D 917, 920 (1972).
74. Barrow, Balanced Program Service, supra note 38, at 641. See also id.
at 635-36, 639-41; Note, First Amendment Rights of Television Viewers, supra
note 38, at 832.
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can at least put together an organization that would make legitimate

efforts to produce or purchase programs that informed as well as
entertained and attracted high ratings.
Discretionof the Licensee
Implicit in the concept that a licensee should be something of a
professional is the idea that he should have broad discretion. The
FCC speaks of the licensee having to make "reasonable judgments in

good faith." 75 To govern its duty to judge the licensee, the FCC articulated a standard that is not unknown to lawyers, namely that
the Commission's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the licensee as to any of the. . . programming decisions, but rather
to determine whether the licensee can be said to have acted reasona76
bly and in good faith.

More recently, in initiating an overall review of the fairness doctrine,
the Commission said of the licensee's duty under the fairness doctrine: "The individual licensee has the discretion, and indeed the
responsibility, to determine what issues should be covered, how

much time should be allocated, which spokesmen should appear,
and in what format. . .. ,,77 Although this statement may indicate
a retreat from the standards expressed in prior years, 78 it does re-

flect that any duty on the licensee entails a fair amount of discre79
tion.
The point of this discussion is not that such a standard exists
and is presently enforced; rather, the point is that the concept of a
licensee who is required to use judgment to inform the public on
75. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial
Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
76. Id.
77. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 27-28 (1971).
78. See id. at 35-36 (concurring opinion, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson).
79. Perhaps a better statement is the following one the Commission made
when it first approved editorializing. At that time the FCC said:
The licensee will in each instance be called upon to exercise his best
judgment and good sense in determining what subjects should be considered, the particular format of the programs to be devoted to each subject,
the different shades of opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen for
each point of view. . . . Undoubtedly, over a period of time some licensees may make honest errors of judgment. But there can be no doubt
that any licensee honestly desiring to live up to its obligation to serve the
public interest and making a reasonable effort to do so, will be able to
achieve a fair and satisfactory resolution of these problems in the light of
the specific facts. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1251-52 (1949).
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controversial issues is neither new nor incapable of statement. As
Professor Barron pointed out some time ago, if the FCC enforced
these obligations vigorously, "fairness" would become "at least as
manageable a concept as . . . 'unfair labor practice' and 'unfair
competition . . ."80 Furthermore, the concepts of honest judgment and good faith efforts do not lack meaning. Many lawyers can
recognize the difference between their good faith view of what the
case law holds and what they would like the law to be, either in
terms of their client's interest or the public interest. In our society
it is necessary and important to make sophisticated judgments. These
judgments are implicit in the everyday life of the lawyer, and they
are not any less difficult than having to distinguish between a licensee
who has made good faith efforts to present a reasonable amount of
informative programming subject to the fairness requirement and the
licensee who never falters from the pursuit of the single-minded
purpose to maximize profits. Of course, there may be close cases,
and the fact that the standard may be flexible may make it subject
to abuse; but, as the FCC emphasized, the possibility of abuse is no
reason to abandon a standard. 8 1 In this regard, one must consider
that the FCC maintains procedural standards and that its judgments
are subject to judicial review.82
Building on language already in FCC opinions, the FCC could
evaluate licensees to decide whether they had made good faith efforts
to devote reasonable time to the presentation of important public issues of a controversial nature.8 3 This is not a situation in which a
licensee needs such a clear standard that he can limit his performance
to the bare minimum necessary to fulfill the obligation imposed upon
him. Such an effort would not satisfy the good faith requirement.
80. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness,"supranote 3, at 34.
81. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1256 (1949).
82. Id. Judicial review of FCC decisions in this area would be vigorous. See
Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concurring
opinion, Wright, I.), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3488 (U.S. March 5,
1973) (No. 72-1207). Judge Tamm's opinion in that case, which affirms a denial
of a license renewal, extended for almost 45 pages. See note 111 infra.
83. In a sophisticated society, standards should not be limited to what can be
stated simply. Broadcasters perform an important and sensitive function in our
society. As Chief Justice Burger wrote shortly before assuming his present position
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court:
The infinite potential of broadcasting to influence American life
renders somewhat irrelevant the semantics of whether broadcasting is or
is not to be described as a public utility. By whatever name or classification, broadcasters are temporary permittees-fiduciaries-of a great
public resource and they must meet the highest standards which are embraced in the public interest concept. Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Licensees with network affiliations should be demanding that the
networks give them more controversial programming. 84 All licens-

ees should seek to obtain controversial programming, and, of course,
fulfill their obligation to determine whether they must supplement
the programs obtained in order to comply with the fair coverage requirement. 85 There is a big difference between a licensee who presents controversial programming during prime time and the licensee

who fills the Sunday morning schedule with public affairs programming so that he will meet the minimum standards of public service.

Naturally, many licensees will fall within a middle ground, but if a
licensee does devote some portion of prime time each evening to con-

troversial programming, as well as having controversial programming on at various times throughout the schedule, and makes good

faith efforts to give fair coverage to important issues even if it means
sacrificing more lucrative programs, it should not be hard to find
that he complied with his obligation. Licensees who make a policy
of accepting editorial advertising rather than refusing it, and licensees who seek out controversial guests rather than finding excuses to
keep them off the air"6 can also be considered as making good faith
efforts to fulfill their obligations. One can distinguish between enter-

tainment programming that simply mirrors only that image of the
community to which the fewest number would object and program-

ming, be it entertainment or any other kind, that probes issues of
vital concern to society and raises the kinds of hard questions that
84. Cf. F. FRIENDLY, Dun TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL 223-24
(1967). For a good discussion of the problems of getting controversial programs
of public importance covered by the networks, see generally id. passim.
85. Even the FCC has recognized that licensees may not rely on the sources of
their programs to meet the fair coverage obligation. See Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40
F.C.C. 598, 605 (1964).
86. The FCC seems to recognize the problem with regard to the possibility of
excuses for avoiding controversial guests. It recently stated:
In the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949), in which the basic requirements of the fairness doctrine were set
forth, we held that a broadcast licensee was not required to insure that
both sides of an issue would be heard before any time could be afforded
for discussion of the issue. A contrary holding, we pointed out, would
tend to limit discussion to formats where both sides were present and
would give the spokesmen for one point of view an effective veto power
over presentation of the issue if they refused to appear. On the other
hand, we also rejected the proposition that a licensee's sole obligation was
to refrain from suppressing or excluding responsible points of view.
Rather, we made clear that a licensee has an affirmative duty to encourage and implement the broadcast of conflicting viewpoints on controversial public issues. Friends of the Earth, 23 P & F RADIo REG. 2D
917, 920 (1972).
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go to the heart of the difficult issues that divide the society and provoke
controversy.
Professor Roscoe L. Barrow suggested that the FCC could
adopt criteria to aid in the determination of what is a controversial
issue and what is an issue of public importance. Writing in 1968,
he stated:
Among the criteria which might be considered are degree of contentiousness, purpose and effect of the espousal, nature of disagreement
between the espouser and the group seeking to reply, value of clarification to community understanding of the issue, the societal values
underlying the issue, and the importance of the decision to society ....

87

It is not that these criteria would determine the issues. Indeed, the
present author would doubt that the determination of whether an issue is controversial should depend on whether a group sought to
reply, although, of course, that fact should be of some significance.
The point is that criteria can be developed to identify controversial
issues of public importance, and that the FCC can therefore evaluate
whether licensees devoted a reasonable amount of time to such issues
and made good faith efforts to cover them fairly.
Implicit in this argument, of course, is the idea that the determination of a controversial issue may involve complexities of a somewhat greater order than the traditional determination of whether
government interfered with free speech. The key point here is that
the licensee is being evaluated as to his good faith efforts to fulfill a
fiduciary duty and that in fulfilling that duty he will be given a fair
88
amount of discretion.
87. Barrow 542-43.
88. Id. at 543. Cf. David Hare, 24 P & F RADIO REG. 21) 807, 810 (1972),
where the FCC said:
Initially, whether or not any given program is a controversial issue of
public importance is determined by the individual licensee. The Commission will, of course, review the licensee's decision generally only to
determine whether the licensee acted reasonably under all the circumstances.
See also Barrow 487-88, where it is stated:
In evaluating the inhibitory effect of the fairness doctrine on broadcast
journalism, consideration should be given to the procedure followed by
the Commission in handling violations. The Commission does not monitor broadcasts for violations but acts only upon a complaint by listeners,
and if a violation is found, the broadcaster is merely asked to broadcast a
contrasting viewpoint.
Of course this statement would not apply to an overall failure of a licensee to
broadcast controversial programming during the term of the license if the doctrine
discussed by the present author were to be enforced.
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Protectionof the Licensee
Another aspect of the problem is whether a sufficient standard
can be articulated to protect the licensees in their presentation of controversial programming. In this area the distinction between promotion and suppression, which seems reasonably clear, would serve
to permit the protection of the licensees. In renewing a broadcast
license in the face of complaints about the broadcasts of "offensive"
poetry, a play by Edward Albee, "The Zoo Story," and a discussion
by homosexuals of their attitudes and problems, the FCC said:
We recognize that as shown by the complaints here, such provocative programing as here involved may offend some listeners. But
this does not mean that those offended have the right, through the
Commission's licensing power, to rule such programing off the airwaves. Were this the case, only the wholly inoffensive, the bland,
could gain access to the radio microphone or TV camera ...
In saying this, we do not mean to indicate that those who have complained about the foregoing programs are in the wrong as to the
worth of these programs and should listen to them. This is a matter
solely for determination by the individual listeners. Our function,
we stress, is not to pass on the merits of the program-to commend
or to frown. Rather . . . it is the very limited one of assaying, at
the time of renewal, whether the licensee's programing, on an overall basis, has been in the public interest and, in the context of this
issue, whether he has made programing judgments reasonably re.89
lated to the public interest ...
The FCC also approved the application of the principle in the foregoing quote in dealing with complaints about broadcasts containing
anti-Semitic material" and derogatory material about American In91
dians.
89. Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 149 (1964). Recently, the FCC had
occasion to comment on two controversial programs. The Commission said:
We note, however, that the networks are to be commended for this type
of broadcast (e.g., the CBS "Harvest of Shame"; the recent NBC Migrant Workers program). For, these programs typify the commitment to
"robust, wide-open debate" upon which this nation depends. They do not
constitute simply a measured, careful assessment of where other entities
or public opinion are, but rather demonstrate a devotion to leadershipto breaking open forcefully, effectively, and fairly issues of great importance. It goes without saying that this kind of effort is called for,
whatever the effect on the broadcast media advertiser. Friends of the
Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 751 (1970), remanded on other grounds, 449
F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
90. United Federation of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204, 208-09 (1966). Cf. Atlanta NAACP, 25 P & F RADIO RuG. 2D 54 (1972).
91. David Hare, 24 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 807, 809-10 (1972).
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This discussion is not aimed at setting forth the FCC's policy.
Indeed, it is hard to square the policy as set forth here with the FCC's
decision declaring a forfeiture against an educational radio station
because of the broadcast of an interview with a person who used a
great many so-called "dirty" words. 92 Even there, however, the
FCC reaffirmed its policy of "promoting robust, wide-open debate."9 3 Rather, the point is that with regard to direct censorship of
controversial material, the distinction between promotion and suppression is clear. Indeed, in the case involving the dirty words, it
seems clear that the FCC was acting to suppress the free speech of
people whose speech habits offend some.94 There is a difference
between prohibiting offensive programming and regulation to promote diversity and access.9 5 The fact that there exist people in positions of power who would like to suppress offensive programming
should not be permitted to obfuscate that distinction.
Given that distinction, and given the idea that promotion of
speech need not include limitation of controversial content, the FCC
could enforce a duty that would require licensees to present substantial amounts of controversial programming. The duty would not
go to requiring broadcasters to present material on any particular issues, nor would the FCC need to become involved in the point of
view presented. Rather, the FCC would evaluate the performance
of the licensee based on whether the station contributed to the discussion of controversial issues of public importance in a substantial
manner. The standard would not have to be specific. The licensee
would be treated as a trustee with a high degree of duty to utilize
his discretion to inform the public. The evaluation would be
based on whether the discretion was used in good faith to present
controversial programming as distinguished from the use of discretion to minimize controversy in order to avoid offending listeners.
By enforcing discretion rather than dictating programming content,
the FCC would avoid suppressing speech or interfering with editorial judgments made by the licensee. Because the licensee is a
fiduciary who should be held to a standard of good faith rather than
being permitted simply to fulfill a "bare minimum" standard nec92. W(JHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
93. Id. at 415.
94. See id. at 417-21 (dissenting and concurring statement, Commissioner

Cox).
95. See Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media:"A Constitutional Analysis of
FCC Regulatory Standards,84 HAv. L. Rv. 644, 698-99 (1971).
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essary to retain a license,9 6 guidelines set by the FCC would not result in directly shaping the program content. Rather, the licensee
should be presenting an amount of controversial programming dealing with issues of public importance sufficiently in excess of any minimal guidelines so that decisions concerning any one program need
not consider the FCC standards. And, if by some chance there
appears a new applicant at renewal time who, in comparison with
the licensee, appears to be better able to fulfill the fiduciary duty,
the licensee may lose his license. But such competition is already an
integral part of the licensing system,9 7 and the doctrine of the fiduciary duty, as proposed here, could be incorporated into it.9 8
FCC's FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

AND THE NEED FOR POSITIVE REGULATION

FCC Practice
Recently, in discussing the coverage of environmental issues,
the FCC said:
While we have stressed that the broadcaster has large discretion in
choosing and covering controversial issues of public importance, it
would be no more reasonable for broadcasting to ignore these burning issues of the seventies-which may determine the quality of life
for decades or centuries to come-than it would be to ignore the issue of Vietnam 99or the issue of racial unrest in communities racked
by this problem.
In a footnote to that statement, the FCC stressed that the licensees
retained discretion as to what to cover and the methods of presentation, and reaffirmed that wide areas remained for judgment by
them. 0 0 One would assume that that judgment would be limited
to judgment leading to extensive coverage. 191 But in the above case
the FCC refused to evaluate the licensee's exercise of judgment de96. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 860 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

97. See id. See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(d), 308-09 (1970).
98. See S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
99. Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 750-51 (1970), remanded, 449 F.2d
1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
100. Id. at 751 n.9.
101. Cf. Note, FCC License Renewal Policy, supra note 49, at 138, where it is
said: "Ihe controlling principle of the Fairness Doctrine, that the public has the
right to have the mass media function consistently with the first amendment, is
offset by the right of the licensee to control and manipulate discussion to the derogation of those rights."
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spite the complaint charging inadequate coverage. 02 Instead, the
FCC suggested that the matter would be considered, upon appropriate complaint, in a license renewal proceeding where the entire
record of the licensee with regard to the coverage of controversial
issues could be considered."' 3 Were the FCC engaged in a process
of vigorous enforcement of licensees' fiduciary obligations at renewal, one would not take the skeptical view of such a statement;
such a view may be justified, however, in the light of FCC practice.
This kind of dichotomy between actions and words seems typical of the FCC's behavior. In sharply criticizing the FCC for its
failure to enforce the fairness doctrine,10

4

Professor Barrow was

moved to say: "Some of the most beautiful language to have flowed
from the pen of government has come to us through the Commission's fairness decisions .... ."10; Despite the high-minded lan-

guage, the FCC does not inspire confidence in its desire to enforce
the duty of the broadcasters to give fair coverage to controversial
issues of public importance.' 06
There is one case, Brandywine-Main Line Radio (WXUR), 10 7

in which a broadcast license was not renewed primarily because of
102. Friends of Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 751 (1970).
103. Id.
104. Barrow 469-72.
105. Id. at 469.
106. See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness," supra note 3, at 35; Marks 976;
Note, Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,47 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 83, 97-98 (1972); Note, FairnessDoctrine,
supra note 3, at 1250. In his concurring opinion, Commissioner Johnson stated:
"It is becoming increasingly clear that the Fairness Doctrine, rather than serving as
a means of satisfying legitimate demands for access, is increasingly functioning as an
'Unfairness Doctrine' by legitimizing broadcaster frustration of those demands. .....
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 35 (1971). Commissioner
Johnson was speaking of a right of access where complainants seek either the right
to reply to material, including commercials broadcast or the carriage on the station
involved of particular counter-advertisments. See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); Friends of the
Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), remanding 24 F.C.C.2d 743
(1970); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Neckritz v. FCC, 446
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971). Although the main concern of this article is with the
enforcement of a high degree of duty on the licensee to present controversial issues
fairly, the author thinks that the right of access branch of the fairness doctrine is
a useful supplement to the licensee's duty. See note 11 supra. At the same time it
should be noted that advocates of access seem to recognize the need to maintain the
trustee system of broadcasting. See Johnson & Westen 583-84.
107. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 41
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the station's failure to comply with the fairness doctrine. The FCC
also found in Brandywine that the licensee did not fully inform the

FCC, failed to adhere to its representations concerning program
plans,108 and "made no efforts during the relevant license period

which were sufficient to meet its public interest obligation of ascertaining the community's needs and interests."'1 9 Nevertheless, the
FCC found that the "failures by the licensee to afford a fair forum

for the discussion of contrasting views on controversial issues of public importance and to afford opportunities to reply to personal at-

tacks" were sufficient to deny renewal. 1 0

The Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the action of the FCC,

and, in a lengthy opinion, Judge Tamm said:
U.S.L.W. 3488 (U.S. March 5, 1973) (No. 72-1207). See note 111 infra.
Where a fairness violation was combined with an attempt at concealment, the
FCC denied renewal of a license. Milton Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADio REG.
2D 369 (1972). On the other hand, there seems to be a tendency on the part of
the FCC to resort to short-term renewals instead. In one recent case, not based
on fairness, the FCC found that the licensee's performance had "been marked by
serious deficiencies." Medford Broadcasters, Inc., 24 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 359,
365 (1972). Writing for the FCC, Commissioner Reid said: 'fThis licensee has
paid insufficient attention to matters pertaining to station operations, and he has
delegated licensee responsibilities and obligations to an intolerable degree." Id.
Nevertheless, the FCC found "public interest considerations here which justify a
short term renewal." Id. While this last case did not involve a fairness problem, it
illustrates the Commission's use of the device even when a licensee's actions have
been found to be "intolerable." In the case of one licensee, Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the proceeding to the FCC on a standing issue, after the latter had granted Lamar Life a
short term renewal of its broadcast license for WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi.
Office of Communication of the Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966). See M. Mnrrz & J. CoHEN, AMERPCA, INC. 238-39 (1971). Nevertheless,
on remand the FCC renewed the license for a full three-year term and the court
of appeals was forced to direct the FCC to vacate the renewal and invite applications for the license. Office of Communication of the Church of Christ v. FCC,
425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In writing the court's opinion, Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger indicated the insensitivity of the FCC to its obligations that
is reflected in the short term renewal process when he said:
When the matter was again before the Commission on our remand,
therefore, it was in a posture that the licensee had yet to demonstrate that
it was in the public interest for the license to be renewed. This was a
less favorable posture for the licensee than would have been the case absent the "probationary license" grant. This is important, but its significance seems to have eluded the hearing Examiner and the Commission as
well. . . Id. at 545.
108. 24 F.C.C.2d at 28-32.
109. Id. at 34.
110. Id. at 28. A perusal of Appendices A and B to the FCC's opinion reveals
that the violations during the monitored weeks were particularly egregious. See id.
at 35-37.
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The alleged violations of fairness and personal attack rules are fully
documented. The abuses are flagrant. The sanctions borne of the
litigation were based on continuous refusals by the licensee to meet
its obligations. .... "I
111. 473 F.2d 16, 60 (1972). Judge Tamm also said:
The Commission has made no attempt to influence WXUR's programming or censor its programming in general or specifically. Had the licensee met the obligations required of it we have no reason to believe that
Brandywine would have met with any difficulty. The law places requirements on licensees as fiduciaries. Failure to live up to the trust
placed in the hands of the fiduciary requires that a more responsible
trustee be found ....
Id.
At first, Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in affirming the FCC decision "solely on
the ground that the licensee deliberately withheld information about its programming plans. A full statement of his views will issue at a later date." Id. at 63.
Judge Wright concurred "on the ground that substantial evidence supports the
Commission's finding that appellant misrepresented its program plans and thus
consciously deceived the Commission. . . ." Id. Judge Wright also said:
If this case did not involve an unpopular fundamentalist preacher, for
me it would be an easy one indeed ...
But because the Commission's ruling has the possible effect of suppressing the ventilation of views with which there might be substantial
disagreement, its action denying renewal of the license requires particularly careful scrutiny. As Judge Tamm's opinion makes clear, in such a
case it is not enough simply to find that substantial evidence in the record
taken as a whole supports the Commission and there was no abuse of discretion. In these circumstances the court itself should make its own evaluation of the evidence to insure that First Amendment freedoms of the
licensee and the public are fully and fairly taken into account in the decision making process. .. . So doing, I cannot say that the Commission
erred in denying the renewal application in this case. Id.
After the first opinion was filed, Chief Judge Bazelon decided to dissent.
473 F.2d 63 (1972) (per curiam). He said that the case was primarily one involving fairness, and that it presented "a prima facie violation of the First Amendment." Id. He stated that the "constitutional validity of each and every application
of the [fairness] doctrine must be tested on its own, on a case-by-case basis."
Id. at 71 (footnote omitted). He also questioned the continuing validity of
the scarcity rationale on which Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
396-401 (1969), was based. 473 F.2d at 75-78. His change of mind seemed to be
based in part on his realization that even the deception issue was "inextricably
bound up" in matters relating to the fairness doctrine. Id. at 80. He concluded
that the case should be remanded to the FCC for a "searching inquiry into factual
issues and alternative policies raised within the constitutional framework outlined"
in his opinion, id. at 64, and in the context of the FCC's present proceeding dealing
with fairness. Id. at 79. (The FCC's proceeding, The Handling of Public Issues
Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971), is discussed in notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text.) At one point in his dissenting opinion Judge Bazelon asked: "Ought we
not instead focus our attention on how we can make the cable medium economically accessible to those who assert a right to use it?" 473 F.2d at 76 (footnote

omitted).
Judge Wright wrote another opinion in which he made clear that his concurrence in the court's judgment was based solely on the ground of deception. Id.

at 80. He also said that Judge Tamm, who concurred in this opinion of Judge
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Thus, the result in the case, given the need to provide fair coverage
of issues that are presented on the air, is not disturbing. What is
disturbing is that the case stands practically alone, and that it appears that the FCC will enforce the doctrine vigorously against a
station licensee broadcasting extremely controversial material, but
does not seem to act vigorously against licensees who broadcast only
the bland type of programs. 1 2 To act against a station engaged in
the expression of controversial views, while promoting the coverage
of public issues only with encouraging words, simply reinforces the
behavior of licensees who try to avoid controversy as much as pos11 3
sible.

The FCC recently instituted "a broad-ranging inquiry into the
efficacy of the fairness doctrine and other FCC public interest policies. 1" 4 Commissioner Johnson concurred, saying, "[n]eedless to
say, the law couldn't be any worse than it now is; it is unlikely the
Inquiry will do much more harm."' 1 5
In its first decision under the notice,"" the FCC refused to extend an "equal time" or equal opportunity requirement similar to that
which applies to political speeches during election campaigns to
speeches of the President of the United States." 7 Once again the
FCC, although failing to impose any new requirements on licensees,
set forth encouraging words." 8 Once again the FCC reaffirmed its
basic principle regarding control of content, namely that the licensee
Wright, would affirm the FCC on that ground also. Therefore, he pointed out,
the ground of deception forms the sole basis for the court's judgment. Id. at 81.
Thus, said Judge Wright, "we avoid plunging into the constitutional 'thicket' that
is the fairness doctrine." Id. Judge Wright also seemed to feel that the opportunity should be given to the FCC to reevaluate the fairness doctrine. See id.
112. Note, FCC License Renewal Policy, supra note 49, at 138.
113. See id. at 137.
114. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971). Recently,
FCC Commissioner Wiley was reported to have suggested that an FCC task force
on deregulation might suggest some "experiments" such as abrogating the fairness
doctrine in an area where there were many stations serving different audiences.
Shanahan, F.C.C. Is Reducing Government Role in Broadcasting, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 4, & at 78, col. 6.
115. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 36 (1971) (conconcurring opinion, Commissioner Johnson).
116. The FCC divided the inquiry into four parts. See id. at 26.
117. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 24 P & F RADIO R.Er. 2D 1917
(1972).
118. Id. at 1925, 1933.
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is the person who must control the programming and must exercise
good faith efforts to discharge a fiduciary obligation.110
Enforcement of the Duty
One cannot quarrel with the FCC's policy that in order to keep
the public informed the licensee must have wide discretion. In the
area of radio and television communications, there is need for a high
degree of skill and creativity as well as the need for the professional
qualities of journalism. But little will be accomplished in achieving
widespread compliance with even the stated goals of the FCC unless
it undertakes to discipline licensees who fail to make good faith efforts to cover controversial issues. Licensees operate in a commercial context, and the FCC must serve as a countervailing force to
encourage such programming in the face of licensee efforts to attract the largest audience and earn the highest profits. 120 The
broadcasters, of course, argue that any pressure from the FCC in
any way relating to content constitutes an abridgment of their first
amendment rights. That contention has been aptly characterized in
the following language:
[S]uch arguments seek to use the first amendment as a screen behind
which many broadcasters may engage in the activity most important
to them-earning money from deliberately noncontroversial
pro121
graming designed to appeal to large, profitable audiences.
Thus, if the fiduciary duty is to have any meaning, the FCC
must enforce it. The enforcement of such a duty does not mean
abridgment, but rather promotion, of speech. The process depends
upon a division between the FCC and the licensee that leaves the
licensee with full discretion to carry controversial issues and full discretion with respect to the details of programming. But that discretion cannot be discretion to refuse altogether to present controversial
issues. It is here that the licensee must be held to the standard of
"good faith efforts" to fulfill the obligations imposed upon those
119. Id. at 1926, 1929.
120. See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L.
Rv. 701, 716 (1964). Accord, Marks 1001, where it is stated:
Congress intended that broadcasting serve the public's needs, not merely
the private interests of the licensee. Since program content is presently
determined by licensee profit potential, not by the needs of the various
groups in the community, the Commission must build the need to present
"better" programs into broadcasting'scorporate model of profit maximiza.
tion-station managers and network executives must believe, as they
plan their respective schedules, that if insufficient time is devoted to
meeting public service obligations, station licenses will not be renewed.
121. Malone 249 (citation omitted). See Barrow 486-87.
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who exercise control over an important communications medium,

subject to a license and under a statute that prohibits those without
a license from competing. 2 '

The best way to enforce the duty is

probably through the license renewal procedures.'2 8 It is inan overall evaluation of the licensee's performance that a good faith efforts
test can best be applied.

This is not to say that the FCC should

not continue to hear complaints about individual programs on the
ground that the station failed to give fair coverage to a particular

issue. 124 Rather, from the standpoint of improving the overall coverage with regard to both amount and fairness, it is suggested that

an overall evaluation works best to combine the goals of stimulating
more and better controversial programming without inhibiting the
licensee from performing his professional duties to provide robust,
wide-open programming. If the kind of professional programming
that best serves the needs of the public is to be encouraged, the licensee

should be insulated as much as possible from detailed regulation by
the FCC.

At the same time, the recognition of licensee discretion

should not be used as a device to permit licensees to avoid their obligations.
It has been suggested that because of broadcasters' commercial
motivations, it would be difficult to enforce the requirement that
broadcasters cover controversial issues, at least without a conflict

with first amendment values.'

5

But, because of the FCC's powers,

broadcasters are so extremely responsive to the FCC that one can
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
123. See Marks 1001-04, where he proposes a stricter license renewal standard
and discusses some of the details that might be involved in such an evaluation
process. While those details may be instructive as to what the FCC might consider, the present author believes that a good faith standard, if enforced, would
serve the purpose without inhibiting good faith efforts by licensees to be creative
and to take risks in presenting controversial programming.
124. The FCC procedure for handling fairness complaints is set forth in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 600 (1964). See also FCC, The Public and
Broadcasting: Broadcast Procedure Manual, 37 Fed. Reg. 20510 (1972) (the manual can be obtained from the FCC). Professor Barrow discusses the procedure for
handling fairness complaints and advocates the use of monetary forfeitures in the
fairness area. Barrow 469-72.
125. Malone 253. Professor Malone says, "[s]tronger attempts to require
broadcasters themselves to produce such programming can lead only to significantly
increased federal regulation over programming with the threat of federal dominance
of the marketplace of ideas and stultification of first amendment values." Id.
It is the purpose of this article to suggest that a good faith efforts standard of enforcing the fiduciary obligation can achieve more controversial programming without resulting in control of the views expressed or in the suppressing of views.
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speak of its activities as "regulation by raised eyebrow.' 120 Because
of the sensitivity of broadcasters to FCC regulation, it would probably not be difficult to make the broadcasters more responsive to
their obligations if the FCC were prepared to enforce the obligations

by denying license renewals where those obligations are not met.
If the FCC were to maintain the distinction between promotion and
suppression and enforce the obligations by means of an evaluation

of good faith efforts, there would not be any conflict with first
amendment values.

This conclusion must be conditional, however.

A good faith

efforts standard cannot be enforced against the licensees unless the

FCC makes a good faith effort to do S0 .127 Furthermore, while a
developed doctrine distinguishing between promotion and suppression would make it possible to enforce the standard without suppressing speech, to achieve that kind of enforcement, it is necessary
to have strong and independent commissioners.
Improvement of the FCC

Essential to an understanding of the process by which the promotion rather than suppression of speech can be accomplished is a
recognition of the two-tier nature of that process.

The primary re-

sponsibility rests with the broadcaster, but the FCC must enforce the
126. Loevinger 291 (where the author refers to the phrase as the "clich6 of
'regulation by the lifted eyebrow."'). The more extensive statement is as follows:
Every broadcasting operation is subject to a host of technical regulations
and sooner or later is bound to violate some of them. There may be differences of opinion as to the seriousness and the sanctions of almost any
violation, and the attitude of the Commissioners or their staff toward a
broadcaster cannot be assumed to be wholly devoid of possible influence
toward such issues. Consequently a prudent and responsible broadcaster
is likely to be very responsive to the views of FCC commissioners and
staff, regardless of his own judgment as to the public needs or demands.
Though not often articulated in this context, the fact has become a
stereotype of FCC thinking which is reflected in the clich6 of 'regulation
by the lifted eyebrow.' This simply indicates recognition of the fact that
occasional martyrs or heroes will assert their independence regardless of
consequences to themselves; but, in general, people will bend to the will
of those who wield power over them, and the independence of individuals
and enterprises will be inversely proportional to the power government
thus exerts. Id.
127. As former FCC Commissioner Loevinger wrote,
the Commission, like the courts in first amendment cases, must be prepared to accept unpopular, and even hateful or despicable, expression as
entitled to constitutional protection and the right to utterance. If the
constitutional principles previously declared by the Supreme Court are to
be maintained, the Commission cannot, as it has done in the past, declare that "atheists or persons with similar views" are not entitled to
radio time, or write a long homily on the virtues of permitting all views
regarding religious subjects which concludes by summarily denying the
opportunity for atheists or freethinkers to present their views. . . . Id.
at 293 (citations omitted).
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broadcaster's fiduciary duty and protect the broadcaster who fulfills
that duty. In all likelihood the broadcaster will present views on his
station that may be "upsetting" and "shocking" to many. 12 8 Furthermore, the FCC will, to a large extent, need to modify the accepted role of the licensee in the process. Thus, the FCC will have
to be composed of people willing to act vigorously in the public interest with a commitment to the ideals of the first amendment.
Admittedly, the statement that we need better men in the regulatory agencies not only fails to sound novel, but approaches the
status of clich6. It has been said before, 29 but the situation seems
particularly acute today.'
Regulatory commissioners cannot help
but be involved with the industry that they regulate, but as Professor William L. Cary points out, when appointments are balanced
to include pro-industry people there must be some doubt as to
whether the underlying problems in an industry can be tackled. 13 1 In

addition, what has been called a "subgovernment" has been built up
around the regulatory agencies, and through that structure the indus-

try point of view gets communicated vigorously to these agencies.'3 2
128. See id. at 294. Loevinger has stated:
With respect to public issues, the primary responsibility of the licensee is
not to approve or disapprove the content of material broadcast but to
provide facilities for the broadcasting of views that are fairly representative of the range of opinion within the community. If this involves
broadcasting views that are upsetting, and even shocking, to many, as it
almost surely will in contemporary society, that consequence is the inescapable result of the first amendment mandate as construed by the Court
and applied to the limited and licensed broadcasting facilities available in
present technological and social circumstances. Id.
129. See, e.g., Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60
COLUM. L. Rv. 429, 444-46 (1960).
130. Judge Friendly suggests that things have not always been bad, in this context, and points to the high esteem in which the ICC Commissioners were once
held. Id. at 431. That situation presented a sharp contrast to the situation in
1960. Id. Whether or not the problem is one of our perception really does not
matter. This article is written against a background of continuing criticism of the
broadcasting industry. Furthermore, the economic structure today appears sufficiently complex so that individuals acting without the support of government can
accomplish little. In such a context it seems imperative to attempt to structure
regulatory commissions so that such agencies can enforce the public interest in a
manner that might get better results than following the concept that what is good
for the industry is good for the public.
131. W. CARY, POLrrIcs AND THr REGULATORY AGENcIES 63-64 (1967).
132. Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 883-84
(1971). Cf. E. GRIFFrIH, THE AMRICAN SYSTEM OF GovERNmNT 102 (4th ed.
1965), where it is said: "The common interest and origin of a committee and a
bureau, together with the presence in Washington of representatives of the special
groups, tend to create the phenomenon of 'government by whirlpools."' See also
id. at 102-03.
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According to FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, the public, as
opposed to the industry, is virtually unrepresented before the FCC.3tI

The situation is exascerbated by the fact that many regulatory commissioners feel dependent on the industry that they regulate for their

next job. 134 The situation has become so acute that a phrase, the
"deferred bribe," has been coined to label the problem.1 33
These difficulties with the regulatory agencies make suggestions

such as the one in this article appear futile.

Concepts that would

work, if adopted in good faith, are subject to the criticism that they

cannot work because of the realities of regulation. Thus, the industries that surround the agencies remain free from suggestions for re-

form. The suggestion in this article that the FCC could improve
broadcasting by enforcing the fiduciary obligation of licensees in a
positive way finds substantial roots in the language of the FCC opin133. Johnson, supra note 132, at 884.
134. Id. at 885. Professor Cary stated the problem in the following language:
Much has been made of the danger of entertainment by the industry regulated, but the problem is deeper. It rests basically on the question of
personal security. Do they want to be liked? Or do they seek power?
Do they look for a further career in the administration? And what are
they going to do when they leave? Do they plan to work for the industry? If so, some commissioners may feel that they probably should not
be too severe in their views, although I found that a company with which
I was very strict, though I trust fair, wanted me as its chief executive
officer when I left. Another intangible element of personal security is
whether a particular commissioner wants to be a judge and therefore may
not feel free with counsel who are powerful lobbyists or with their clients
who exert a wide influence. Some of the Washington lawyers have developed a remarkably subtle method of exposing the source of their power
without threatening to exercise it. . . .

Cary, supra note 131, at 10-11.

135. See Johnson, supra note 132, at 885. Commissioner Johnson indicated
that, although the origin of the phrase is unknown, it is often credited to Ralph
Nader. Id. at 885 n.68. Commissioner Johnson's description of the process as
follows is instructive:
Year after year, regulatory commissioners and staff leave their posts and
go to work for the very industries they were supposed to be regulating.
The agency is a well-known training ground for industry personnel, a
graduate school for the regulatory subgovernment. Many young lawyers,
for example, plan to work for the FCC for a few years and then move to
higher paying jobs in the communications bar of Washington. They are
naturally careful not to alienate the broadcasters during their stay at the
Commission, lest they jeopardize their chances of future employment.
Once they are firmly ensconced in private practice, they keep in touch
with friends at the Commission, and through them, the Commission policies, trends, and views. In part, this phenomenon is a natural result of the
communications industries' ability to offer higher salaries to really outstanding staff members. But it is at least equally the result of rather
depressing working conditions for young staff members, whose creative
efforts are often squelched by entrenched section heads and bureau chiefs
and by the agency's general lack of will to play a positive regulatory role.
At the same time, many of the staff, before coming to the Commission,
worked for the very communications industries they now regulate. Id.
at 885.
See also id. at 894-95.
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ions. Yet it departs from the FCC practice because it would involve
the FCC in enforcing the good faith efforts of licensees to meet
their admitted obligations. Although the suggestion calls for what
might be considered a radically new policy of using positive government controls to promote free speech, it also can be considered very
little more than a request that the FCC should live up to its own
rhetoric. The FCC must break away from its present policy of
speaking loudly and carrying no stick at all. If the difficulty with
the suggestion is that the FCC lacks sufficient vigor or independence to implement it, then the criticism should center on the FCC,
not the suggestion.
Although the purpose of this article is to propose the development of an enforceable good faith efforts standard, it is necessary to
at least refer to some suggestions for improving the FCC to the point
where the enforcement of such a standard may be a real possibility.
Commissioner Johnson proposed that public interest groups, such as
Common Cause, could keep lists of recommended commissioners,
screen them, and make public their findings, much in the way
the organized bar screens judicial appointments. 13 6 He also suggested salaries comparable with those of the executives in the regu13 7
lated industry.
Judge Friendly has suggested ten-year terms.1 38 He also points
out that some have suggested making commissioners who serve the
longer term ineligible for reappointment and giving them liberal pensions. 139 Although he found merit in that suggestion, he thought that
it might be better first to draw on people who retire compulsorily
from "universities, industry, labor and government itself."'' 40 Judge
Friendly stopped short of recommending life tenure for commissioners, 141 but he was talking about commissioners of all the federal
agencies.
Recently a presidential advisory council recommended that
most of the independent regulatory agencies be abolished and their
42
functions taken over by agencies headed by a single administrator.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
L.

ASH,

Id. at 896.
Id.
Friendly, supra note 129, at 445.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 445.
THE PRESIDENT'S ADISORY CouNcIL ON EXECUTIVME OGRANIZATION (RoY
CHAIRMAN),

A NEW REGULATORY FRA.iEWORK:

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES

5-7 (1971).

REPORT ON SELECTED
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The council recognized the unique nature of the FCC by excepting
that agency from its recommendations because the FCC "deals with
the most sensitive issues in the broadest area since its regulation relates, in part, to program content.' 14 3 Since the FCC is involved
in the heartland of first amendment values and because, under the
more positive regulation discussed in this article, the FCC would
become more involved in the protection of free speech, it does not
seem excessive to suggest that FCC commissioners be given life tenure subject to a mandatory retirement age and a pension.
Another possibility is to attempt to develop a cadre of independently minded people who would have life tenure as government employees, but would not necessarily be full-time commissioners. One could lengthen the term of commissioners, as Judge
Friendly proposes, but then make active use of the former commissioners in other capacities. One possibility that naturally comes to
mind is to develop a professional administrative law service in which
members have life tenure. Members of that service could principally be administrative law judges, and commissioners could be
drawn from among the ranks of the administrative law judges. After
serving a term as a commissioner, they could either revert to the
role of administrative law judge or perhaps serve on a policy formulation committee. The possible variations are great and include a
service in which the members rotate among commissions. The main
point is that their career patterns would not involve going back and
forth between government and industry. Furthermore, such a professional service might be able to develop the kinds of ethics and
commitments to the public interest that would enable them to communicate with the regulated industries and still use their powers to
defend the interests of the general public.
In short, we should not admit futility-there are possible solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to present the best solution. What is suggested is that we can find the "good men" to do
the job if we want to find them.' 4" In trying to improve society,
we must focus on our institutions, and that includes trying to structure them in such a way that the men and women who comprise them
can be independent enough to perform their functions in a manner
consistent with the expressed goals of their jobs. Our society is long
on rhetoric; we must begin to think about how people can live up to
that rhetoric.
143. Id. at 116. See also id. at 116-18.
144. See Friendly, supra note 129, at 444.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Central to the thesis of this article is the problem of how to
make the nation's institutions work. Regulation of radio and television rests in the hands of an independent regulatory commission subject to review by the courts. If the FCC is going to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, basic doctrines concerning the first
amendment must be refined. Furthermore, it is important to begin to develop areas of enterprise in which business judgments are
made in the public interest. Broadcasting is "in theory" such an
area. But discretion cannot be regulated by words alone. The
time has come to develop doctrines that permit the enforcement of
obligations imposed upon people performing public functions within
the context of corporate organizations.
Broadcasters perform significant public functions in connection with their control of radio and television. These functions are
subject to a fiduciary duty on behalf of the public to present important controversial public issues fairly. It is the thesis of this article
that the FCC can and should enforce that obligation by reviewing
the performance of broadcast licensees to see that they have made
good faith efforts to inform the public in accordance with this obligation. The function of controlling a broadcasting station is too important to be left to the dictates of the profit motive alone. A licensee
must be considered to be in the business of informing the public as
well as in the business of making money through the sale of advertising space. The licensee should perform editorial and educational
functions leading to the maximum use of the broadcast media to inform the public.145 In this author's opinion, the broadcaster can
inform the public by means of entertainment programming as well
as through the more traditional news and public affairs programming.' 4 It must be recognized that a licensee must perform a professional function'4 7 that includes organizing not only news and
public affairs programming, but also seeking out entertainment programming that deals with controversial issues of public importance.
145. See Comment, The Broadcast Industry: The Commercial Television Licensee and the Editorial Function, 18 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 683, 704-05 (1972).
146. Cf. Malone 204-05.
147. Cf. Bagdikian, Right of Access: A Modest Proposal, 8 CoLum. JOURNALISM REv. 10 (1969). "One function of news is the professional judgment of
what is more and what is less important at any given hour. There can be only one
lead, one second lead, one third lead. Despite all the flaws in these decisions,
someone has to do it, and judges and legislators are not able to do it better."
Id. at 12-13.
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The present writer is not in a position to suggest the extent to which
a licensee should be forced to actually engage in the production of
programming. There should probably be some production requirement in the area of local news and local affairs, but it is also likely
that programs dealing with national issues as well as general public
issues might better be produced for national consumption. The
theory is that if licensees were put in a position of having to demand
such programs, then networks and production and distribution companies would market them. In any event, the function of the
licensee involves editorial judgment and judgments of taste as well
as business judgments. A licensee is accountable for his business
judgments to himself and others who provide the capital, but he
must also be held accountable by the FCC for those judgments made
148
as a fiduciary on behalf of the public.
What is important in our society is the development of institutions that function in the public interest. To some extent the
profit motive may be a good regulator, but experience in radio and
television indicates some of its drawbacks. Where the profit motive
proves less than sufficient, the response in this country has been
regulation in the public interest. To make that regulation work we
must recognize that the discretionary types of duties involved can
and must be enforced. The good-faith-efforts concept of regulating the broadcast licensee in the performance of his fiduciary duty
to the public, which is discussed in the body of this article, provides
a feasible basis for regulating the licensee. We must get away from
the idea that the need for discretion is just a license to fail to fulfill
a duty and begin to move toward the enforcement of the duties that
people operating the radio and television stations owe to the public.
Admittedly, the enforcement of such a duty involves the FCC in
the area of first amendment protection. But the fact that free
speech is involved can be viewed as an additional reason to insure
that licensees perform in the public interest. While it is both true
and unfortunate that government does tend to suppress speech, that
148. It should be stressed that to hold a licensee accountable for the exercise of
a duty to give fair coverage to controversial issues is very different from encouraging a licensee to limit network programming that criticizes the government. Of
course, an agency engaged in regulation of broadcasting could encourage licensees
to limit criticism of the government if it chose to abuse its power and neglect the
distinction made in this article between promotion and suppression of free speech.
That is why it is necessary to deal here with the necessity of improving the FCC.
But the fact that some government officials may act to engender the fear of censorship should not be allowed to obscure suggestions designed to promote speech and
to insure the full coverage of all viewpoints, including those critical of government.
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should not be considered a reason to permit private persons who control a public resource, the commercial broadcast spectrum, to do so
also. In the first place, as discussed in the body of this article, there
is a distinction between promotion and suppression that is both recognizable and enforceable. In the second place, our free speech has
always depended on the extent of enforcement by one branch of
government-the courts. The crucial question is not whether there
is to be a government agency enforcing the promotion of speech, but
rather whether that government agency will have sufficient independence and vigor to do so. It is doubtful that the FCC as presently
constituted and appointed has that much vigor and independence.
But instead of using the FCC's present inadequacy as an excuse to
avoid improvement of the broadcast media, it seems far more sensible
to improve the FCC. For this reason, some suggestions to that
end are presented in the body of this article. The challenge is to
develop an agency that possesses that type of independence we tend
to attribute to the courts in most discussions of the protection of first
amendment rights. At the same time, the type of regulation involved requires that the FCC also possess the characteristics of an
independent regulatory agency, but with more of the vigor associated
with our ideal of such a body. The fact that the challenge may be
formidable only reflects the difficulties inherent in operating a complex society and in attempting to develop institutions that will move
the society toward the achievement of its stated goals.
Inherent in both the regulation of discretion and the promotion of
speech is a recognition that discretion and judgment on the part of the
licensee is involved. The FCC, in the enforcement of the doctrines
discussed here, would have to exercise a considerable amount of discretion and judgment of its own while regulating the discretion and
judgment of the licensees. The present author believes that the process can work. Obviously it involves complicated interpersonal relationships. It involves regulation in good faith in a manner associated today much more closely with the ideal than with the practice.
But we are at a point now where much needs to be done in the improvement of our institutions, and it is necessary to begin to think
in terms of the enforcement of duties involving judgment and professional expertise to a greater extent than we have in the past.
Professor Jaffe warns against overemphasizing the importance
of broadcasting in the political sector.1 49 But he is not suggesting
149. See Jaffe 770-71. He is speaking primarily about television in the context
of suggestions for counteradvertising and direct public access.
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the elimination of the fairness doctrine and even proposes that it
should continue to be applied to advertising.'"0 Furthermore, were
the broadcast licensee's obligations more vigorously enforced, radio
and television might have more influence on political life in this
country. At the same time, others differ from Professor Jaffe regarding the importance of broadcasting. For example, Professor
Barrow has written the following:
The democratic process is undergoing a time of trial. The
growing complexity of society, standardization of tastes and attitudes,
the centralization of communications, all tend to isolate the individual
and to discourage his responsible participation in public affairs.
Television has the greatest potential of all communications media to

contribute to social and cultural development and to provide a forum
in which the individual can be encouraged to participate in the solution of the problems of his time. 151

Another factor to consider are some of the recent developments
related to the fairness doctrine involving direct public access to the
broadcasting media.' 52 With the development of cable television,
the possibility of public access channels is becoming a reality. 158
While direct public access serves a very useful purpose in supplementing professional broadcast coverage of issues, it is hardly a substitute for the performance of the professional obligations of broadcast licensees discussed in this article. Public access cannot provide -the kind of sustained coverage and professional journalistic
functions that can be provided by a licensee discharging his fiduciary obligations in a good faith manner. 4
The development of cable television will also probably result
in a greater diversity of stations in a given market, especially in view
of the fact that cable systems may be required to originate program150. Id. at 777. But Jaffe does say that "the logic of applying the fairness doctrine to advertisements should not be expansively exploited." Id. at 779.
151. Barrow, Balanced Program Service, supra note 38, at 664. See Malone 194,
197 n.15. See also Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 42 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
152. For a good summary and discussion, see generally Jaffe 780-92. See also
1972's 'Vox Pop' is Access Through Spots, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1972, at 29-30.
153. See Krebs, Storefront TV Studio Opened by Teleprompter to Aid Harlem,
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1972, at 51, cols. 3-4; O'Connor, TV: Public Access Fete, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1972, at 51, cols. 3-4. Cf. Note, Concepts of Broadcast Media
Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal,47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 83,
108 (1972).
154. Cf. Mayo, supra note 12, at 297 (1954).
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ming.15
But in this context one must remember that "[d]iversity
of ideas, not multiplicity of forums, is the primary objective of the
first amendment."15' 6 Furthermore, at this point in the development of cable television, it would be unwise to make any firm assumptions about the type of programming it will originate in its
developed years.
Similarly, the development of public broadcasting suggests that
government might exercise positive efforts to realize the potential of
broadcasting without requiring the same of the nongovernment
licensees. While public broadcasting deserves applause and encouragement, it is not a substitute for a commercial broadcasting system
that is well run in the public interest. Furthermore, public broad157
casting today finds itself severely hampered by difficult problems.
The existence of possible alternatives to commercial broadcasting should not be used as an excuse to permit the commercial
broadcasting system to function on a for-profits-mainly basis.
Rather, we should view the commercial broadcasting system as the
present heart of the broadcast media. Technological advances that
increase diversity or permit listeners to pay for programming they
want and new institutional devices such as public broadcasting should
be welcomed and developed as an important supplement (and perhaps incentive) to the commercial system. But positive efforts must
be made to ensure that the commercial broadcasters, while enjoying
the profits from the broadcasting business, 158 function in the public
interest in their role as trustees of an important communications
system held for the use and benefit of the general public.
Finally, a few words about constitutional doctrine are necessary. The thesis that the FCC can go much further than it has to
require broadcasters to cover controversial issues of public importance without infringing on free speech or limiting creative judg155. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Note that
cable systems are regulated. See id. See also United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
156. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right 498. See Johnson, supra
note 38, at 20.
157. See Public Broadcasting: Widening Breach on First Principles, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1972, at 35-36; Macy Resigns as Public TV Head, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 11, 1972, at 47, cols. 2-4.
158. See Hearings on S. 2004, supra note 49, at 609 (statement of Senator
Tydings). The FCC recently reported that in 1971, the first year in which cigarette advertising was banned from broadcast media, television industry revenues
($2.75 billion) were down 2.1% from 1970, although in 1970 cigarette advertising
accounted for 69o of the revenues. P & F RAio REG. Rep. No. 25-33 (1972).
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ment on the part of licensees receives constitutional support from
Red Lion. 15 9 Indeed, the concept grows out of Red Lion, and under that decision it would appear to be constitutional. 160 As already
mentioned, that decision is grounded in the existing scarcity of broadcast frequencies and consequent regulation. 16 The Supreme Court
did not reach the issue on which the thesis of this article is based:
that there is no abridgment of free speech by government activity
that promotes speech.' 62 Even under the scarcity rationale, it can
be argued that newspapers are subject to positive duties with regard
to speech. 1

If government promotion does not violate free speech,

it would seem to follow that the press could be subjected to the
same kinds of duties as the broadcasters.'0 4 Furthermore, underlying the thesis of this article is the idea that corporations that perform public functions, although denominated "private," must fulfill
their duties to the public, and especially those duties involving important public values expressed in the Constitution.'0
At this point it would be premature to extend the concept of
more positive regulation to the press even though the present author
feels that the doctrine can be developed to allow the enforcement of
the public's right to fair coverage of issues without limiting or infringing free speech. The broadcast media are presently regulated,
and as emphasized, the success of the ideas discussed here depends
Although it
on the development of a strong, independent FCC.'
may be necessary to have some sort of judicially enforced right of
access to the press,'0 7 it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss

the concepts developed here as applied to the presently unregulated
press. Suffice it to say that the idea of positive regulation and promotion of speech is presented here as an idea that can work, but
has not really been tried with the vigor and good faith dedication that
it deserves. As with all legal doctrines and ideas, it will develop with
application. Until it is developed through application, it would be
wiser to limit it to an industry already subject to extensive regulation by an independent regulatory commission.
159. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
160. See id. at 393-94. Cf. Loevinger 290-91. But see Brandywine-Main Line
Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 71 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion, Bazelon,
CJ.).
161. See 395 U.S. at 400-01. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
162. See 395 U.S. at 401 n.28.
163. See Barron, Access to the Press 1666.

164. Cf. Loevinger 296.
165. Cf. Berle, supra note 43, at 953.
166. Cf. Johnson, The Regulatory Ideal, supra note 132, at 893.
167. See Barron, Access to the Press. But see Bagdikian, supra note 147.

Vol. 1973:89]

BROADCAST LICENSEE

At the same time it is hoped that the idea of enforcing discretion in the regulation of broadcasting will receive consideration by
those who deal with regulation in other areas of economic enterprise. The enforcement of discretion as a supplement or limitation
on the profit motive in order to achieve the public interest may be
applicable in other areas where there may be a neglect of the public
interest. In this context it is somewhat distressing to note that the
Supreme Court seems to be taking a somewhat expansive notion
of what constitutes private activity; 168 this may well serve to retard
the development of the idea of the public responsibility of corporations that becomes necessary as the social and technological organization of our society continues to change.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a strong, independent FCC
could enforce the broadcast licensee's obligation to present controversial issues of public importance fairly to a much greater extent
than is now done without infringing on first amendment values.
Indeed, such regulation would promote the ends of the first amendment. The thrust of this article is that such promotion can be accomplished without suppressing speech, if done by the enforcement
of a good-faith-efforts standard by an independent regulatory commission, itself making a good-faith effort to achieve the goal of an
informed public, and itself dedicated to free speech as an important
end: Such regulation can be undertaken while preserving wide latitude for the broadcast licensee to use professional judgment and
discretion in covering important issues in all types of programming.
The goal should be the fullest use of the broadcast media, and that
requires the enforcement of the public's rights through regulation
in the public interest. The doctrines of enforcement discussed here,
by reflecting the distinction between promotion and suppression and
by recognizing the need for discretion exercised in good faith to promote the given end, would, if enforced in similar good faith, go a
long way toward serving the public interest.
168. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
(dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).

Compare id. at 570-86

